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ABSTRACT: Stephen Stich has criticized the possibility of providing a legitimate set of norms for 
reasoning, since such norms are justified via reference to pretheoretical intuitions. I argue that 
through a process of perspicuously mapping the belief sphere one can generate a list of intellectual 
virtues that instrumentally lead to true beliefs. Hence, one does not have to rely on intuitions since 
the norms of reason are derived from factual claims about the intellectually virtuous agent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The goal of this paper is to argue that the intellectual virtues can be the ground, or 
foundation, for argument norms. This position is formulated as a response to a 
position developed by Stephen Stich. Stich has criticized the possibility of providing 
a universal and legitimate set of norms for reasoning, and therefore argument, on 
the grounds that such norms are justified via a reference to pretheoretical 
intuitions. These pretheoretical intuitions, according to Stich, are too variable and 
therefore cannot provide a legitimate set of rational norms. In response to Stich I 
will argue for a causal theory of such norms. More specifically, I will rely on Martha 
Nussbaum’s method of perspicuously mapping different spheres of human 
experience to generate a set of rational norms. The specific sphere to be mapped is 
the doxastic, or belief, sphere. The idea is that through mapping this sphere one can 
generate a list of intellectual virtues, or character traits, that reliably and 
instrumentally lead to true beliefs. One would not have to rely on intuitions, and 
therefore Stich’s criticism could be avoided, since the ground for claims concerning 
norms of reason would be grounded in empirical data; i.e. through observation of 
those traits that reliably and instrumentally lead to true beliefs. With such a 
position, then, the norms of reason, or argument, would not rest in language but 
instead in the intellectually virtuous agent. I will begin the development of this 
position with a consideration of Stich’s criticism. 
 
2. STICH’S CRITICISM OF REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND ANALYTIC 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Stich formulates his criticism in a book called The Fragmentation of Reason. The 
MARK C. YOUNG 
2 
specific target of his criticism is a position developed by Nelson Goodman who, 
according to Stich, attempts to “ground an account of the justification of cognitive 
norms in an analysis or explication of the common sense notion of justified 
inference” (Stich, 1993, p. 75). The process that Goodman endorses for identifying 
justified valid inferences, either deductive or inductive, is called a process of 
reflective equilibrium. It is a process where one can determine the rules of valid 
inferences by checking them against accepted practices of valid inferences. More 
specifically, we check them against judgments about specific inferences and then 
generate our rules on the basis of these specific judgments. We can then employ the 
rules generated in this way to pass judgment on future specific inferences. Goodman 
admits that this process appears somewhat circular. We come up with rules by 
consulting specific sanctioned inferences and then we use these rules to assess the 
validity of other specific inferences. How Goodman addresses this charge of 
circularity is by proposing that it is a virtuous, and not a vicious, form of circularity. 
This is because both rules of inference and specific inferences themselves are 
deemed justified by “being brought into agreement with each other” (Goodman, 
1965, pp. 66-67). It is a delicate process where we make “mutual adjustments 
between rules and accepted inferences” to generate agreement between the two 
(Goodman, 1965, pp. 66-67). This is why it is called a process of reflective 
equilibrium, as it involves a reflective process where one attempts to generate 
agreement between rules and accepted inferences. And, according to Goodman, this 
is all the justification that is required for our rules of valid inference (Goodman, 
1965, pp. 66-67). Even further, Stich interprets this position offered by Goodman to 
be definitive of justification. That is, justified inferences simply are those inferences 
that pass the reflective equilibrium test. So the reflective equilibrium test, according 
to Stich’s interpretation, does not merely provide good evidence for the claim that 
certain inferences are justified, but instead is constitutive of justification. 
Consequently, Goodman’s reflective equilibrium test would seem to fulfill an 
important role in determining the norms of argument as any inferences that pass 
that test determine what justification is (Stich, 1993, p. 78). 
Of course, the circularity of this process may be enough for many to reject it. I 
will not focus on this criticism, though, but instead Stich’s criticism of Goodman’s 
position. One thing I would like to note before setting out Stich’s criticism is that he 
makes a distinction between cognitive norms and the rules of logic, and his main 
concern is with the former. Stich thus admits that Goodman’s position can be 
interpreted as an attempt to identify the rules of logic and not cognitive norms, but 
Stich proposes that he will interpret it as an account of the latter. Although I will not 
defend this claim right now, but possibly in discussion after, I will to some extent 
reject this distinction. That is, I do not accept a sharp distinction between the rules 
of logic and cognitive norms. I admit that not all cognitive norms are grounded in 
valid argument forms, as I interpret the intellectual virtues as psychological 
dispositions and yet also cognitive norms, but it seems quite plausible to me that 
any inference deemed valid within logic should be included on our list of legitimate 
cognitive norms; or norms of thinking that people should adopt. I will, of course, 
offer some remarks on the relationship between cognitive norms and the rules of 
logic later in the paper (Stich, 1993, p. 78). For now, let’s turn to Stich’s criticism of 
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this position offered by Goodman. 
Stich offers a two-prong attack; one prong directed specifically at Goodman 
and the other at what he calls analytic epistemology in general. The first prong, 
directed at Goodman specifically, proposes that it is quite possible that if we 
engaged in the reflective equilibrium test we would have to accept as justified 
inferences certain inferences that are obviously unjustified. Stich cites the gamblers 
paradox as an example – or the illegitimate inference that the more times one does 
not role a seven increases the probability of rolling a seven with the next throw of 
the dice. This inference is unjustified, but nonetheless it is typically sanctioned by 
most people when they are engaged in the process of reflective equilibrium. Hence, 
it passes the test of reflective equilibrium and should be considered a justified 
inference. Of course, those who we can call experts in the analysis of inferences 
would not want to count such an inference as justified but how can we dismiss it as 
a unjustified inference if reflective equilibrium is the only test we have (Stich, 1993, 
pp. 83-86)? It is a possible solution to this problem that then leads to the other 
prong of Stich’s criticism which is directed at analytic epistemology in general. 
The proposed solution to the problem of sanctioning illegitimate inferences 
involves conceptual, or linguistic, analysis, and ultimately reference to what are 
called ‘pretheoretical intuitions’ concerning rules of justification. Stich considers 
such a procedure to be definitive of analytic epistemology, and he claims that it is an 
irrelevant failure (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-91). The main problem, which already may be 
obvious, is relativism. That is, if the method to be employed to identify legitimate 
inferences is reference to ordinary language, and our pretheoretical intuitions 
concerning justification, then it is always possible that divergent, and possibly 
incompatible, justification rules will emerge. That different linguistic communities, 
when consulting their language and supposed pretheoretical intuitions, will come 
up with completely different sets legitimate inferences. This result is not very 
reassuring, since it appears that favouring any one set justified inferences is simply 
the result of cultural, or linguistic, bias. One would have no grounds to dismiss the 
merits of conflicting lists of justified inferences, since they would result from the 
same justificatory process as one’s own (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). They also appear to 
be the only means by which we can determine justification, according to Stich’s 
account of analytic epistemology, so that divergent sets of justification rules would 
be equally justified; even if they contradict one another. Such a procedure would 
therefore not get us very far in identifying, or establishing, a legitimate set of 
argument norms, unless one wants to embrace relativism. I would feel 
uncomfortable with such an embrace, and hence I will attempt address Stich’s 
criticism by consulting a position developed by Martha Nussbaum and apply it to 
the identification of intellectual virtues. I will then propose that these intellectual 
virtues, or various aspects of intellectual character, can provide a foundation for 
argument norms. 
 
3. NUSSBAUM’S METHOD OF PERSPICUOUS MAPPING 
 
Nussbaum derives her position for virtue identification from Aristotle. She proposes 
that Aristotle did not limit himself to simply offering an account of what is good for a 
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human life on the whole, but also sets out what would be considered appropriate for 
specific spheres of human experience. What the process of virtue identification 
involves is first identifying some sphere of human experience which all human 
agents typically encounter, and then setting out the proper way to act within that 
sphere. Examples of such spheres include: “Fear of important damages esp. death,” 
“Management of one’s personal property, where others are concerned,” and 
“Distribution of limited resources” (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 261-262). Nussbaum 
refers to these spheres of human activity as ‘grounding experiences.’ Faced with the 
‘grounding experience’ one can then discern what would be the best way to 
respond, and, according to Aristotle, this usually involved adopting some virtue that 
is a mean between a deficiency and an excess. The above examples would entail 
courage, generosity and justice respectively (Nussbaum, 1998, 261-263). It is 
therefore the sphere of experience, or the grounding experience, which fixes the 
range of evaluation. It limits the choices one can make, and through analysis of that 
sphere, or grounding experience, one can determine the best way to act; i.e. identify 
specific virtues. 
To accomplish this task, Nussbaum continues, we first offer a ‘thin,’ or 
‘nominal,’ definition of what is appropriate to the particular sphere – the term 
‘courage’ would be an example of such a nominal definition – and then, through a 
‘perspicuous mapping’ of the grounding experience, we can move on to give a more 
precise indication of what is required to act appropriately within the sphere of 
human experience. The virtues then emerge as the most appropriate 
motivations/dispositions for people to have once the sphere of experience has been 
‘perspicuously mapped’ (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 263-263, 269) 
 
4. THE DOXASTIC SPHERE, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND ARGUMENT NORMS 
 
This method advocated by Nussbaum could then be employed in an attempt to 
identify the intellectual virtues. This could then allow one to avoid relying on 
pretheoretical intuitions to provide a set of universal argument norms in the 
following way. First, we identify the appropriate sphere of human experience, which 
in this case, I propose, would be the doxastic, or belief, sphere. Then, through a 
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere we can determine which psychological 
dispositions, or virtues, are conducive to the formation of true beliefs, and which are 
conducive to false beliefs. Those dispositions that are conducive to the formation of 
true beliefs we would identify as intellectual virtues and those conducive to false 
beliefs as intellectual vices. The intellectual virtues would then represent the 
standards of excellence associated with the doxastic sphere, since they facilitate the 
acquisition of true beliefs. The constituents of intellectual character would therefore 
be derived, at least in part, from the observation of actual human agents and their 
belief forming habits, and not through consulting pretheoretical intuitions. Through 
reflection on the doxastic sphere we would thus have empirical input from a non-
culturally specific sphere of experience, i.e. the doxastic sphere.  
The list of intellectual virtues that emerge from this perspicuous mapping 
could then provide the foundation for arguments norms. This is because such 
virtues are identified as truth-conducive, and therefore would facilitate the 
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identification of argumentative structures that are themselves truth-conducive. That 
is, via her intellectual character the intellectually virtuous agent would be able to 
identify which argument structures are conducive to truth in particular contexts. It 
could be the case that the argument structures, or norms, could vary from one 
context to another, but this flexibility would not be perceived as problematic since 
the intellectually virtuous agent and the doxastic sphere would be the sources of 
stability in the process of identifying argument norms. 
Of course, it may be possible for Stich to apply his criticism of relying on 
pretheoretical intuitions to this position. The application would likely runs as 
follows. Stich proposes that the problem of relying on pretheoretical intuitions to 
identify argument norms is simply that these intuitions can vary greatly since they 
are cultural products. That is, they are derived from different cultural practices, and 
as cultural practices vary so too will pretheoretical intuitions about appropriate 
reasoning processes (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). Similarly, then, Stich could argue that 
any attempt to identify certain virtues as truth-conducive will depend heavily on the 
beliefs of a particular culture. As cultures vary so too will their list of truth-
conducive psychological dispositions or intellectual virtues. So one culture may 
identify being open-minded as an intellectual virtue, on the grounds that such a 
virtue leads to true belief, while another culture may hold behaviours such as 
deference to authority and dogmatism to be intellectual virtues for the same reason. 
Consequently, the introduction of the idea of mapping the doxastic sphere would 
not solve the problems of Stich’s original criticism, according to this argument, and 
cannot provide a universal set of argument norms. 
In addressing this possible criticism offered on Stich’s behalf it must be first 
acknowledged that a lot of its sting can be removed by explicating further the claim 
that the identification of the aspects of intellectual character occurs through a 
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere and is not the result of an unreflective 
acceptance of shared, or common sense, intuitions. A significant aspect of Stich’s 
original criticism is that rational norms are to some extent identified via an 
unreflective acceptance of inherited intuitions which result from cultural 
transmission (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). But the process of identifying those character 
traits on our list of intellectual virtues, outlined above, does not entail the 
unreflective acceptance of inherited intuitions. Such virtues are not identified by 
consulting the desires, or intuitions, of agents, nor even various cultural practices; at 
least not exclusively. Instead the sphere of experience, or the grounding experience, 
provides significant input for identifying which traits are truth-conducive. Thus, in 
this case, it would be the doxastic sphere that would limit the choices one can make 
regarding which traits make the list or not, and it is through analysis and 
observation of this sphere, or a perspicuous mapping of it, that one determines 
those traits that are intellectual virtues. In this way, as Nussbaum proposed, 
progress in our understanding of what is virtuous is analogous to progress in our 
scientific understanding of the world, since through our perspicuous mapping of 
grounding experiences we come to formulate a more accurate and fuller 
specification of the types of problems human agents encounter and the appropriate, 
or virtuous, ways to respond to such problems (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 263-264). The 
focus is therefore on actual human experiences and not on simply explicating 
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shared, or inherited, intuitions. Such a process is also reflective, since the 
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere will entail critical engagement with that 
sphere in order to determine which traits actually facilitate true belief. Quite 
generally, then, the doxastic sphere provides something independent of both human 
intuitions as well as cultural practices which can be analyzed to determine which 
character traits would make the list of intellectual virtues. 
Of course, as noted, divergent communities may identify different traits as 
intellectual virtues, which then appears to make the identification of the aspects of 
intellectual character relative to specific cultures. This possibility must be admitted, 
but it does not necessarily preclude the possibility for either consensus or accuracy 
to be achieved in regard to which traits are intellectual virtues. Since we are not 
relying on inherited intuitions to identify which traits are intellectual virtues, but 
rather reflection upon the empirical input of the doxastic sphere, there is the 
possibility that relativism could be removed and both consensus and accuracy in 
our list of intellectual virtues achieved. Such consensus and accuracy is especially 
possible if the agents who are attempting to identify truth-conducive character 
traits are sincerely attempting to be intellectually virtuous. This is because the agent 
who sincerely attempts to become intellectually virtuous will desire truth for its 
own sake. And such a desire should then compel the agent to not favour those traits 
identified by her community, but rather favour achieving true beliefs. This favouring 
of true beliefs, if it is sincere, should then also lead the agent to be open to changing 
the list of intellectual virtues if some trait is discovered not to be truth-conducive. 
So, the intellectually virtuous agent would not unquestionably defer to some other 
authority, whether it is a class of scholars or some text, but instead take care to 
ensure that such deference is actually truth-conducive. If it is not truth-conducive, 
then the intellectually virtuous agent should not attempt to habituate such a 
disposition. Unless a reason for holding that relativism is inevitable in such a 
situation can be provided, then this possible objection from Stich is not really a 
problem. This is simply because, in principle, such relativism could be removed and 
both consensus and accuracy achieved for our list of intellectual virtues through a 
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere; especially if members of the 
community are sincerely attempting to be intellectually virtuous. It would assuredly 
not be an easy task to achieve such consensus, but it does not appear to be 
impossible in principle. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this paper has been to argue for a shift away from the focus on language 
when determining the norms or argument and to instead focus on the intellectually 
virtuous agent. The presumed goal of argument is to achieve true belief, and the 
claim is that by mapping the doxastic sphere truth-conducive virtues can be 
discovered that could then be relied on to guide agents when they are engaged in 
the process of offering and developing arguments. In order to display the merits of 
such a position a criticism of the attempt to derive argument norms, offered by 
Stephen Stich, was consulted and addressed. It was proposed that reliance on 
unreflective intuitions can be avoided if we instead focus on the doxastic sphere and 
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perspicuously map it to identify truth-conducive virtues. There are still a lot of 
details to work out with such a position, but hopefully what has been presented here 
has displayed some of its initial merits. 
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